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* Matthew Allen-Coghlan, Kieran McQuinn and Petros Varthalitis1 
ABSTRACT 
The likely substantial impact of COVID-19 related measures on the public finances of 
European countries has prompted an unprecedented call for new and significant 
policies at a European level to alleviate the pressures on individual Member States. 
The administrative closures adopted across most economies has resulted in a 
complete cessation of certain types of economic activity, a significant increase in 
unemployment and profound fiscal challenges for the countries in question. In this 
paper we use a SOE-DSGE model to assess the role the ECB can play in mitigating the 
negative economic and fiscal effects of the crisis for Ireland by participating directly 
in the sovereign debt management of the country. Our results indicate that the direct 
involvement of the ECB via sovereign bonds purchases increases the efficiency of the 
extraordinary fiscal stimulus packages that were put in place to combat the negative 
impact of COVID-19. A fiscal stimulus at the national level backed by ECB financing 
reduces the output losses in the first year which would otherwise occur. The 
reduction in the output loss ranges from 0.5 per cent to 0.7 per cent depending on 
the mix of fiscal policies chosen by the State. The cumulative reduction in output loss 
over a five-year horizon could sum to 1.4 per cent to 2.2 per cent depending on the 
fiscal policy mix chosen. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of COVID-19 in 2020 has prompted governments across Europe to 
adopt a range of extraordinary lockdown measures. While necessary from a health 
perspective, the cumulated impact of these measures has resulted in unprecedented 
economic fallout, with millions of workers across Europe being made unemployed. 
To mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic, governments across Europe have 
also initiated extraordinary fiscal responses at a national level. In Ireland this has 
included the introduction of wage support schemes, subsidies for business and 
COVID-19 related unemployment payments.2 These significant expenditure 




* The authors are economists at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). They can be contacted at: 
matthew.allencoghlan@esri.ie, kieran.mcquinn@esri.ie and petros.varthalitis@esri.ie.  
1  The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee, David Purdue, Diarmaid Smyth, Rossa White and seminar 
participants at the ESRI for helpful comments. We would also like to thank David Purdue and Rossa White for providing 
data. 
2  See Taking Stock: The Fiscal Response to Covid-19. Irish Department of Finance, November 2020. 
 
2 
economic activity will result in the Irish government encountering substantial fiscal 
challenges this year, with key metrics such as the General Government Balance and 
debt-to-GDP ratios set to be adversely impacted. 
 
As the spread of the virus puts pressure on the public finances of countries across 
Europe, the issue of whether European institutions should provide more support to 
Member States has come to the fore. In this context a number of different options 
have been advanced. Blanchard (2020), for example, called for the ECB to act directly 
and buy Italian bonds. Whelan (2020) endorsed the proposal by Gros and Mayer 
(2012) that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) should be provided with a 
liquidity backstop by having it registered as a bank. Alesina and Giavazzi (2020) called 
for the ECB to lift, temporarily, the constraints on its asset purchase programme and 
in particular the capital key. Furthermore, Alesina and Giavazzi (2020) suggested that 
the additional expenditure required by Member States to address the COVID-19 
issue should be part of an EU programme. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2020) and 
Gourinchas (2020) both supported a debt-financed fiscal stimulus at the European 
level.  
 
This article has two main aims. The first is to examine the impact of the unfolding 
pandemic crisis on the Irish economy. The second is to assess the role the ECB can 
play in mitigating the negative demand and supply effects of the crisis for a particular 
Member State by participating directly in the sovereign debt management of that 
country.3 It is not our intention to recommend the most effective or preferable form 
of European intervention but to demonstrate the impact a particular form of 
intervention would have on the recovery path of the Irish economy. 
 
To conduct this exercise, we utilise the small open economy dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (SOE-DSGE) model calibrated for Ireland developed in Varthalitis 
(2019).4 The model is extended in three ways. First, we introduce demand and supply 
shocks in the model so as to gauge the adverse impact of the pandemic in key 
macroeconomic aggregates of a small open economy member of Eurozone. A 
significant economic fallout has already occurred in Ireland (see e.g. McQuinn et al., 
2020). Second, we develop the fiscal block of the model so as to incorporate a set of 
extraordinary fiscal instruments that are used by national fiscal authorities to 
mitigate the negative effect of the pandemic. Third, and, perhaps more importantly, 




3  There is a growing literature that extends medium scale DSGE models used for policy analysis to study the 
macroeconomic and policy implications of the pandemic. Some examples include Bayer et al. (2020), Faria-e-Castro 
(2020) and Hagedorn and Mitman (2020). 
4  FIR-GEM is a small open economy DSGE model for Ireland. Since the structure of the model is thoroughly analysed in 




Member State economy. This is accomplished by enhancing a SOE model to add a 
union-wide policymaker that can directly intervene in the debt management of the 
domestic economy. 
 
Under our policy experiment, we assume that two policy authorities can intervene 
in the economy of a member of a currency union, the national fiscal authority (the 
treasury) and a supra-national policymaker (the ECB). The role of the treasury is to 
finance its government expenditure, conventional and extraordinary, by levying 
taxes and/or issuing sovereign bonds. The role of the ECB, under our experiment, is 
to buy sovereign bonds from the Member States and set the union-wide interest 
rate. Each Member State’s public debt can now be held by two types of institutional 
creditors, private markets and/or the ECB. Therefore, with such a policy the ECB can 
generate additional fiscal space for the national governments in the short to medium 
run. The timing of when these bonds will start impacting domestic public finances 
depends on the purchasing policy of the ECB.  
 
In terms of the impact of the pandemic shock, we consider two possible outcomes. 
One outcome involves the impacts of the outbreak fading swiftly with economic 
activity, as a consequence, recovering quite quickly. We refer to as the ‘V-shaped’ 
recovery. We also consider an outcome where the pandemic endures and, thus, the 
adverse effects on the economy are more prolonged. This is referred to as the ‘long-
lasting’ outcome. We calibrate the magnitude of the pandemic shock so as to mimic 
the expected fallout in some key macroeconomic aggregates reported in McQuinn 
et al. (2020).5  
 
Our results indicate that the direct financial assistance of the ECB via sovereign bonds 
purchases increases the efficiency of the extraordinary national fiscal stimulus 
packages. A fiscal stimulus at the national level backed by ECB financing reduces the 
output losses in the first year which would otherwise occur. The reduction in the 
output loss ranges from 0.5 per cent to 0.7 per cent depending on the mix of fiscal 
policies chosen by the Member State. The cumulative reduction in output loss over 
a five-year horizon could sum to 1.4 per cent to 2.2 per cent depending on the fiscal 
policy mix chosen and the size of the fiscal stimulus. In terms of national policy, we 
find that extraordinary expenditures such as spending related to enhanced public 
health, labour income, subsidies and/or cash transfers targeted to financially 
constrained households perform better in countering the negative economic impacts 
of the lockdown. Fiscal packages should target households with no other sources of 
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the growing literature that extends medium scale DSGE models used for policy 
analysis to study macroeconomic and policy implications of the pandemic.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; in Section 2 we look at the role that 
could be played by ECB institutions in sharing the debt of Member States. Section 3 
develops the extensions of the model. Section 4 presents the main scenarios 
simulated. Section 5 explains our results and Section 6 outlines some concluding 
comments. For the technical analysis see McQuinn and Varthalitis (2020).6 
2. INCREASED ROLE FOR THE ECB SHARING THE DEBT OF MEMBER STATES? 
At the onset of the crisis, the ECB acted swiftly to support Member States through 
accommodative monetary policy. Through the Pandemic Emergency Purchase 
Programme (PEPP) the ECB will purchase €1.35 trillion worth of sovereign 
government debt up to the end of June 2021 or when the COVID-19 ‘crisis phase’ is 
deemed to be over. This has helped alleviate market fears of default for Eurozone 
countries, in turn keeping borrowing costs down (see Schnabel, 2020). Figure 1 
shows that the initial increase in yields experienced by some Eurozone countries at 
the start of the pandemic have largely fallen back to pre-pandemic rates. 
 









6  In July 2020, McQuinn and Varthalitis (2020) also conducted a quantitative analysis based on year to date information 

















Prior to the PEPP, the ECB engaged in a number of other asset purchase programmes 
in the post-financial crisis era. These programmes were instigated in response to the 
sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area following the financial crisis and the anaemic 
inflation rates throughout the Eurozone in the intervening years. Figure 2 shows the 
amount of long-term Irish government debt held by the Eurosystem/ECB between 
2005 and 2019. The amount of debt held by private markets is also included for 
comparative purposes. Between 2009 and 2013 there was a sharp increase in Irish 
long-term government debt by held by the Eurosystem. This can be attributed to the 
bailout programme that was introduced over this period in which the Eurosystem 
purchased large sums of Irish government debt to make up for the shortfall in the 
public finances. Eurosystem holdings of Irish sovereign bonds continued to increase 
in the following years until it began to temporarily wind down its asset purchase 
programme in 2018. However, these were reintroduced in 2019 and coupled with 
the large scale purchases of sovereign debt as part of PEPP, there are likely to be 
further increases in ECB purchases of Irish government debt in 2020 and beyond. 
 
FIGURE 2  IRISH LONG-TERM DEBT HELD BY THE PRIVATE MARKET/EUROSYSTEM 
 
 
Source: National Treasury Management Agency. 
 
In addition to the monetary policy intervention by the ECB, European Union leaders 
agreed to a multi-year spending package of €1.8 trillion in July 2020. As part of this 
package a €750 billion ‘Next Generation EU’ fund to target the ill effects of the 
pandemic was also agreed. Of the €750 billion, €390 billion will be distributed as 
grants with the rest distributed as loans. This fund will be distributed proportional to 
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will be joint financed by all members of the European Union. This will ensure that 
countries that have seen their debt levels spike as a result of COVID-19 and the 
administrative closures will not be burdened by further debt. 
3. THE MODEL 
Our model is similar to the medium scale small open economy DSGE model 
developed in Varthalitis (2019). We extend the model in the following ways: first, we 
allow for the negative demand and supply effect of the pandemic in the small open 
economy of a Member State of the EU. Second, we develop the fiscal block of the 
model so as to incorporate a set of extraordinary fiscal instruments that are used by 
national fiscal authorities to mitigate the negative effect of the pandemic. Third, we 
allow for a greater policy role of the ECB in providing financial assistance to an 
individual Member State in the form of sovereign bond purchases (for further 
technical details on these extensions see McQuinn and Varthalitis, 2020). 
 
3.1  DSGE model 
The model developed in Varthalitis (2019) follows a typical household utility 
maximisation subject to a sequential budget constraint. Here the model is adjusted 
to take into account the impact of the pandemic which has a negative impact on both 
demand and supply, e.g. consumption falls from containment policies while labour 
supply is restricted due to the administrative closures and/or the risk of workers 
becoming infected. In response to the pandemic, the Government launches a set of 
extraordinary spending instruments to alleviate the negative economic effects. In 
this model the spending instruments can take a number of different forms. The first 
spending type we look at is expenditure related to public health. We assume that 
this type of spending is a strong complement to private consumption. The economic 
logic of this assumption is that the extreme containment measures curtail a large 
part of consumption activities. Households will only be able to restore their levels of 
private consumption if the Government can guarantee a certain level of safety 
through public health measures. The second type of expenditure we look at is a 
labour income subsidy which is proportional to the loss of labour income 
experienced in the private sector. That is, the Government pays back a fraction of 
the income losses occurred during the pandemic. Finally, we look at direct 
extraordinary cash transfers. To account for targeted fiscal policies to different 
income classes, we allow income subsidies and cash transfers to differ between 





3.2  Model policy extension 
We extend Varthalitis (2019) by allowing national fiscal policy to use an extraordinary 
set of spending instruments in a discretionary manner while also allowing for an 
enhanced role for the ECB in purchasing Irish sovereign debt. 
 
Institutional composition of public debt 
Following Economides et al. (2020), we assume that Ireland’s public debt can be 
purchased by two types of creditors that differ in their institutional state: (i) private 
markets, i.e. domestic and foreign agents that participate in the domestic and 
international financial markets and (ii) EU institutions (i.e. ECB). Total public debt in 
period t expressed in nominal terms is: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸     (1) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀  ≡  𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
∗𝑔𝑔 denotes public debt in private markets and is 
further decomposed in public debt held by domestic private agents, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, and 
foreign private agents, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
∗𝑔𝑔. In what follows, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 will be referred to as market-
held public debt. 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸 denotes public debt that is purchased by the ECB and it 
will be referred as ECB-held public debt. Below, we assume that each type of public 
debt incurs different borrowing costs, which have different implications for the 
domestic country’s public finances. 
 
Borrowing cost and type of institutional creditor 
We assume that the borrowing cost faced by the small open economy depends on 
the institutional state of the creditor. In terms of public debt in private markets, we 
assume that the interest rate at which Ireland borrows from the private markets is 
debt-elastic (as in e.g. Philippopoulos et al., 2017): 
 






−  1�      (2) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 ∗  denotes the union-wide interest rate, 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑  is a parameter which measures 
the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to deviations of the market-held public 
debt-to-GDP ratio from its threshold value, ℱ𝑀𝑀. 
 
In terms of public debt purchased by the ECB, we assume that the ECB can lend to a 
Member State at an interest rate lower than the one the Member State would face 
in the private markets, i.e. 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡∗<𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡. This is because the lower interest rate is based on 
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the economic fundamentals and policies of the currency union (e.g. the interest rate 
policy of the ECB). As noted in Reis (2016), in the absence of any sovereign risk 
premium, the two types of bonds are equivalent. However, the higher the sovereign 
risk due to the higher debt levels held by private markets (or for other reasons 
captured in 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑) the larger the importance of the institutional type of the creditor. 
 
National Fiscal Policy 
We assume that the Government has two sets of spending instruments:  
1. Conventional nominal government spending, which includes non-utility 
enhancing government consumption, investment, the public wage bill and total 
public transfers; and 
2. A set of extraordinary spending instruments. These include labour income 
subsidies and direct cash transfers targeted to Ricardians and non-Ricardians 
respectively and public health related government spending.  
 
In our experiments, we assume that market-held public debt, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 is adjusted 
residually to satisfy the government budget constraint in each period t; while the 
ECB determines the supply of ECB-purchased public debt, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸 as well as the interest 
rate paid on this debt 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡∗. Ireland is a member of a currency union; thus we solve for 
a monetary regime without monetary independence and a fixed exchange rate 
regime.  
 
We assume that the national fiscal authorities use one or more fiscal instruments to 
only react to public debt held by private markets. This assumption implies that, in 
the short run, the ECB funded public debt does not impose an extra fiscal burden on 
the Member State’s public finances. 
 
This could be thought of as a situation where policymakers suspend the stringency 
of the fiscal targets amid the pandemic crisis. We have already seen this with the 
suspension of fiscal rules from the EU. As a result, there is less of an immediate need 
for domestic policymakers to adjust their fiscal stance in the near term in order to 
reduce their debt burden. Thus, it creates additional fiscal space for national fiscal 
policymakers to adjust their public finances in an attempt to mitigate the negative 





On the other hand, it should be noted that public debt held by the ECB enters the 
government budget constraint,7 thus, eventually, it will result in a fiscal cost. 
 
That is, in the medium/long run, the ECB funded debt should be financed either by 
the issuance of new public debt in the private markets or by future fiscal adjustment 
(i.e. tax increases and/or spending decreases). The timing of this depends on the ECB 
policy which is specified in the next section. 
 
Extraordinary fiscal instruments  
To deal with the unprecedented nature of the shock, national fiscal policymakers use 
a set of extraordinary fiscal instruments. The fiscal authority sets these instruments 
in a discretionary manner for the specific time period in which the economy is 
affected by the pandemic. 
  
ECB 
In our model, however, we assume that the ECB can utilise two policy instruments 
to intervene in managing the debt levels of a Member State’s economy, namely the 
union-wide interest rate, 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡∗ and sovereign bonds holdings, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸 . 7F8 In terms of 
sovereign bonds holdings, following Sims and Wu (2020), we assume that ECB 
institutions’ purchases of sovereign bonds are set according to a Taylor-type reaction 
function: 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝐸𝐸 −  𝐹𝐹∗𝐸𝐸 =  𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸




𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 −  𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑�+  𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
   (3) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 is the share of the public deficit to output deviation from a target, def, 
that the ECB finances via sovereign bond holdings, 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 capture the speed with which 
these bonds could be reduced and 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 is an iid shock that captures discretionary 
sovereign bonds purchases by the ECB. The policy parameter 𝛾𝛾𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 governs the share 
of the domestic deficit-to-output ratio that the ECB allow to be financed via ECB bond 
holdings in period t. The policy parameter 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 governs the duration of the ECB 
purchasing programme. For example, a short-lived purchasing programme, captured 
by a lower value of 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹
∗𝐸𝐸
 means that the Member State that borrows from the ECB 
will need to generate additional resources in a quicker manner to meet its financing 





7  See Equation 4 in McQuinn and Varthalitis (2020) for details. 
8  For thorough discussion and modelling of the alternative instruments available at the Eurosystem see Economides et al. 
(2020) and references therein. 
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4. SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
We assume two different recovery outcomes for the Irish economy: a V-shaped 
recovery, where the economy is expected to recover quite quickly; and a long-lasting 
outcome, where the negative effects of the pandemic endure for a longer period. In 
the V-shaped outcome, we assume that the containment measures will succeed in 
containing the virus within a short period of time. In terms of the model, this means 
that the pandemic shocks will last one period. If this outcome were to materialise, 
the economy is expected to recover quite quickly. 
 
In the long-lasting outcome, we assume that the supply and demand effects of the 
pandemic will endure for a relatively longer period. This could mean that 
containment measures, e.g. administrative closures, would be released gradually 
and that economic activity will be restored at a slower pace. In terms of the model 
this means that the shocks will die out in around three periods. The magnitude of 
the initial shocks is identical in both scenarios; we only vary the persistence 
parameters and hence the duration of the shocks as opposed to their scale. 
 
4.1 Policy responses 
The Government is assumed to utilise the set of extraordinary fiscal instruments in a 
discretionary manner to mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic. Initially, we 
examine the impact of one fiscal instrument at a time in order to quantify the effects 
on output of each fiscal instrument separately (normalised to 1 per cent of steady 
state output unless otherwise stated). Two alternative public financing scenarios of 
these extraordinary fiscal packages are now considered. 
 
First, via private markets where the emerging public deficits are financed by an 
increase in market-held public debt at the market interest rate. Second, we allow the 
ECB to provide financial assistance to Member States in the form of purchases of 
government bonds.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1  Pandemic impact on the Irish economy 
Figure 3 presents the dynamic responses of the key endogenous macroeconomic 
variables under the two recovery outcomes based on the ‘V-shaped’ and the ‘long-
lasting’ recovery. On the demand side, due to the administrative closures and the 
higher risk of becoming infected, households reduce consumption sharply in the 
short run. Similarly, the rest of the world reduces its demand for Irish goods and 





On the supply side, the pandemic shock causes a substantial fall in hours worked. 
Subsequently, the large decrease in hours worked and consumption will also reduce 
investment. As a result, the combined negative impact of demand and supply causes 
a significant reduction in output. 
 
As expected, the combined effects of these shocks have significant implications for 
key fiscal metrics. The large drop in demand and supply leads to a drop in wages and 
returns on capital across sectors. As a result, the tax base of the economy which 
consists of consumption and income from labour and capital is expected to 
experience a significant fall. Accordingly, there is a sharp rise in the national deficit. 
In Figure 3, we assume that the deficit is financed by an increase in borrowing via 
private markets. Thus, the public debt held by private markets increases and this puts 
upward pressure on the sovereign premia. The rise in real interest rates feeds back 
into the economy and further suppresses investment and consumption. 
 
FIGURE 3 DURATION OF THE PANDEMIC SHOCK AND IMPACT ON THE IRISH ECONOMY 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
Note:  GDP, consumption, investment, hours worked and inflation are in % from their steady state values; Market-held public debt and 
deficit-to-GDP are ratios. The sovereign premia is the rate (%). 
 
5.2 The role of policy 
In Table 1 we quantify the implications of the extraordinary national fiscal policy 
measures on output levels in the first year by varying the fiscal policy instrument 
used to alleviate the negative effect as well as the method of public financing these 
extraordinary fiscal packages. In the first column we report which fiscal instrument 
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is used to deal with the economic fallout. The fiscal instruments which are utilised 
are additional spending in ‘public health’, cash transfers targeted at financially 
constrained households, labour income subsidies targeted at financially constrained 
households9 and the spending fiscal mix. The spending mix is a combination of the 
three aforementioned fiscal instruments. We include two types of spending mix, the 
first is labelled 3 per cent, where there is a 1 per cent increase in health-related 
expenditure, cash transfers and labour income subsidies. The second is a larger 
spending mix of 5.5 per cent where there is a 1.5 per cent increase in health-related 
expenditure, a 3 per cent increase in cash transfers and 1 per cent increase in labour 
income subsidies. This spending mix is based on the forecast growth of expenditure 
on these items in 2020 relative to 2019. It should be noted that there are additional 
spending instruments available to the Irish government such as subsidies to firms but 
for the purpose of this model we limit ourselves to these three instruments. 
 
The results under the two scenarios of public financing; private markets and ECB-
held debt, are presented in the third and fourth column. In the second column, the 
results for when there is no policy intervention at either national or supranational 
level are also presented.10 
 
TABLE 1 FIRST YEAR OUTPUT RECESSION UNDER VARIOUS POLICY SCENARIOS (PERCENTAGE) 
Policy instrument No Policy Market-held debt ECB-held debt 
Health related expenditure -5.1 -4.4 -3.8 
Cash transfers -5.1 -5.0 -4.4 
Labour income subsidies -5.1 -5.0 -4.5 
Spending mix (3%) -5.1 -4.2 -3.5 
Spending mix (5.5%) -5.1 -3.5 -2.8 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
 
In terms of mitigating the negative impact on output, the most effective instrument 
is spending associated with public health. This is followed by a targeted fiscal policy 
which supports the income of non-Savers either via labour income subsidies or direct 
cash transfers. The least effective fiscal instruments are labour income subsidies and 
cash transfers targeted at Savers.11 However, the mitigation effect is quantitatively 
small in most of the cases when these extraordinary fiscal measures are financed 




9  For comparison, the size of fiscal stimulus for each fiscal instrument is normalised to 1 per cent of steady state output. 
10  For comparability, across all three scenarios, the Government uses conventional government consumption to react to 
market-held public debt so as to ensure fiscal sustainability. 
11  We have also examined the case in which the Government increases cash transfers and labour income loss subsidies 
targeted to Savers. However, our results suggest that these extraordinary fiscal instruments are not efficient in terms of 
aggregate output. The economic logic is that Savers have other sources of income, such as access to domestic and 
international financial markets, thus it is expected that these fiscal measures will not affect their consumption plans in 




below). In contrast, when the ECB actively engages in sovereign bond purchases, the 
effect of the extraordinary national fiscal measures increases significantly across all 
fiscal instruments. In particular, increasing spending related to public health by 1 per 
cent of GDP could reduce the output loss by 0.6 per cent more when the ECB 
intervenes, i.e. from 4.4 per cent to 3.8 per cent. Similarly, increases in direct cash 
transfers and labour income subsidies targeted to non-Ricardians/non-Savers 
backed by ECB purchased bonds could reduce the output loss by 0.6 per cent and 
0.5 per cent, respectively. In terms of the spending mix, ECB purchased sovereign 
bonds to mitigate the recession by 0.7 per cent compared to the spending mix being 
funded through private markets. 
 
Finally, the ECB sovereign bonds purchasing programme could enable a quicker 
recovery of the economy. In particular, the cumulative reduction in output loss over 
a five-year horizon relative to debt financing in the private market sum to 1.5 per 
cent, 1.5 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 1.8 (or 2.2) per cent for the direct cash transfers, 
labour income subsidies, spending related to public health and the spending mix 
respectively (Table 2). 
 
TABLE 2 CUMULATIVE OUTPUT LOSS OVER FIVE YEARS HORIZON12 (PERCENTAGE) 
Policy instrument No Policy Market-held debt ECB-held debt 
Health Related Expenditure -8.4 -7.9 -6.5 
Cash transfers -8.4 -8.5 -7.0 
Labour income subsidies -8.4 -8.5 -7.0 
Spending mix (3%) -8.4 -8.2 -6.4 
Spending mix (5.5%) -8.4 -8.3 -6.1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
 
5.3 The underlying mechanism 
Now we examine the mechanism by which the intervention of the ECB can help to 
mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic. We focus on the extraordinary 
spending mix presented in Table 1 and Table 2. Figure 4 compares the dynamic 
responses of the key macroeconomic variables under the two public financing 
scenarios. In particular, the scenarios in which the national deficits are financed via 
market-held public debt and where the national deficits are financed via the ECB. 
These are labelled as ‘Market-bonds financed’ and ‘ECB-bonds financed’ 
respectively. For comparability, we also present results from the scenario in which 
there is no policy response at the national and supra-national level; this is labelled 








purchasing programme can significantly mitigate the negative effect on consumption 
and investment in the short and medium term. This could suppress the initial 
reduction in output and ultimately allows for a quicker recovery in the medium term. 
As expected, on the fiscal side, financing the emerging deficits via the less costly ECB 
bond holdings allows extra fiscal space for the Member State in the short and 
medium term. Thus, the rise in the deficit and public debt is far less prolonged in this 
case. 
 
FIGURE 4 NATIONAL FISCAL PACKAGE AND PUBLIC FINANCING SCENARIOS 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
 
Borrowing from the ECB leads to a smaller rise in market held public debt in the short 
run while it also keeps public debt in the medium/longer run at low levels despite 
the increase in national deficits. ECB-held public debt absorbs the temporary fiscal 
imbalances and thus stabilises domestic public finances in the medium/longer run. 
Lower public debt issued in private markets subsequently leads to lower real interest 
rates. Since the latter affects households’ economic decisions, it makes national 
extraordinary fiscal measures more effective by crowding out less investment and 
consumption. In turn, the milder reduction in consumption and investment leads to 
a faster recovery in hours worked. Thus, labour and capital incomes of households 
experience a smaller decline which creates a further positive feedback loop on 
output. This results in a milder reduction in the associated tax bases, resulting in a 
lower rise in the national deficit across all time horizons. The combined effect of a 
lower rise in interest rates and a smaller decline in the tax revenues leads to a smaller 




financial capital flows in the resource constraint of the small open economy (i.e. the 
balance of payments) which can help the Member State economy to mitigate the 
negative effects of the pandemic. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
As with most Western economies, both the impact of the COVID-19 virus itself and 
the measures taken by the public authorities to counter the spread of the virus will 
have a dramatic and negative impact on the Irish economy. We model the impact of 
the virus with a standard SOE-DSGE model with both demand- and supply-side 
shocks. In simulating the impact of the shock, we assume two potential outcomes, 
(i) a V-shaped recovery where the containment measures succeed in containing the 
virus within a short period of time and (ii) a long-lasting recovery, where the supply 
and demand effects of the pandemic will endure over a longer period. 
 
Our model based results indicate that an ECB bond purchasing programme 
significantly mitigates the negative effect of the virus-related shock on consumption 
and investment in the short and medium run. As a result, the impact on economic 
output is also reduced with a quicker recovery being facilitated in the medium run. 
Under our policy experiment, the ability of a Member State to finance part of the 
emerging deficit via less costly ECB bond holdings results in extra fiscal space for the 
domestic authorities in the short and medium run. This reduces the subsequent 
increase in the deficit and public debt than would otherwise be the case.  
 
In light of the policy measures announced to date, it is fair to say that EU institutions 
generally have committed to playing a more expansive role in dealing with the 
present crisis then in previous cases. In order to maximise the efficiency of this 
support, it is important to be able to quantify the impact of this greater involvement 
on both Member States’ key fiscal variables and growth outlooks. We believe our 
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